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Abstract
Many real-world networks are known to exhibit facts
that counter our knowledge prescribed by the theories
on network creation and communication patterns. A
common prerequisite in network analysis is that infor-
mation on nodes and links will be complete because
network topologies are extremely sensitive to missing
information of this kind. Therefore, many real-world
networks that fail to meet this criterion under random
sampling may be discarded.
In this paper we offer a framework for interpreting
the missing observations in network data under the hy-
pothesis that these observations are not missing at ran-
dom. We demonstrate the methodology with a case
study of a financial trade network, where the awareness
of agents to the data collection procedure by a self-
interested observer may result in strategic revealing or
withholding of information. The non-random missing-
ness has been overlooked despite the possibility of this
being an important feature of the processes by which
the network is generated. The analysis demonstrates
that strategic information withholding may be a valid
general phenomenon in complex systems. The evi-
dence is sufficient to support the existence of an in-
fluential observer and to offer a compelling dynamic
mechanism for the creation of the network.
Keywords: complex systems; networks; data collection;
missing nodes/links; dissortative networks; assortative mix-
ing; observer effect; strategic information withholding
Introduction
When individuals are aware of being monitored, their
behavior is likely to improve. This intuitive insight
was first studied through a sequence of experiments in
the field of organizational behavior, conducted at the
Hawthorne works in the 1920s [15]. The trials showed
that the workers’ mere awareness of being monitored
resulted in increased productivity, regardless of the di-
rection of change in the working conditions. This ef-
fect is known as the ‘Hawthorne Effect’, or the ‘Ob-
server Effect’.
In this paper we argue that the presence of a self-
interested data collector in financial complex networks
may instigate a change in the behavior of participants
such that the network visible to the collector differs
from the actual one. This effect has far-reaching im-
plications on our understanding of the processes gen-
erating such networks: the way by which the players
connect or dissociate, the kind of information that is
hidden, and the overall effect of this on the stability
and functioning of these systems.
Imagine for a moment that a monitoring entity such
as a federal or regulatory agency, a bank or even a con-
cerned parent, is observing a network of social or busi-
ness ties (a crime network, the financial transactions of
a stock broker, or the social activity of a child in his
favorite social network). Assume further that subjects
are aware of this monitoring procedure. It is only nat-
ural to expect that some information will be withheld,
strategically, from the monitoring entity. The strategic
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disclosure of information may be a consequence of the
activity in the neighborhood where the agent resides,
and the sensitivity of his payoff to the observer’s pres-
ence. Unfortunately, detection of the influential pres-
ence of an observer is extremely challenging because
the true underlying network is not given to us, and thus
it is particularly hard to discriminate the true dynamics
from the visible one. Notwithstanding, we believe that
this strategic withholding of information from the ob-
server leaves traces on the visible topology as well as
on other, intrinsic, measurable attributes of the partici-
pants.
Although it is possible that many complex systems
in the real-world are influenced by the data collection
procedure, only a small subset fulfil the set of prereq-
uisites which may offer the opportunity to test the hy-
pothesis that the visible system was formed under the
presence of an influential observer. The prerequisites
are: (i) The network appears to be dominated by sam-
pling error, with abnormally large number of discon-
nected components, large diameter, or a small number
of neighbors on average. (ii) There exists an under-
lying theory that specifies the motivations of different
agents to hide or disclose information, and the inter-
est of the observer to monitor the ties formed by them.
(iii) The consequent sensitivity of different agents to
the observer’s presence is quantifiable and could be re-
trieved from the data. (iv) The visible network permits
the measuring of the intrinsic attributes of agents, the
communication patterns between them, and the incen-
tives to disclose or withhold information. To this list
we could add the trivial requirements that is met by
most network models: (v) It is possible to obtain topo-
logical aggregates of the visible network, and to com-
pare them with the topological measures of a network
under full information.
We propose a procedure to measure a system under
monitoring. The procedure begins by analyzing the
topological attributes of the visible network vis a vis
the expected structure under full information. If major
discrepancies appear to be present, we move on as fol-
lows: we identify the observer and the agents, classify
agents into classes (species) that exhibit different sen-
sitivities to the presence of the observer, and prescribe
an information disclosure strategy to each class. The
proposed classification is derived from a known under-
lying theoretical foundation (e.g. profit maximization,
risk aversion, thinking at the margin) that may support
such differential information disclosure strategy. We
then check whether the visible network indeed exhibits
such species-dependent information exposure - as pre-
dicted by the theory - and compare the revealed effect
with the one expected under full information. We com-
plement the procedure by adding mediation analysis to
rule out possible alternative dynamic mechanisms of
the system that are observationally equivalent.
To make our point we searched for a complex sys-
tem that has interacting agents, and where a collector
of the data possesses potential impact on the payoffs
of the agents. We further required that it would be
possible to estimate the sensitivities of agents to the
observer’s presence. Naturally, financial networks ad-
mit to these criteria. These networks usually consist
of profit-maximizing agents (firms) that are grouped
into well defined classes according to attributes such
as industry, credit-rating, firm size, aversion towards
risk, liquidity, and so on. Moreover, data on these net-
works are normally recovered by self-interested third
party agencies that interact with subsets of the agents
and possess a direct and measurable influence on the
agent’s payoffs. These self-interested parties may be
banks or regulatory agencies.
We were able to locate a large-scale business net-
work where firms are buyers and sellers and the trans-
actions between them are the ties. These data are col-
lected by a bank for operational needs of maintaining
credit lines with its borrowers. Thus it plays the role
of the observer and has a clear incentive to monitor the
financial activity of its customers. This network com-
plies with the prerequisites prescribed above; it is in
the real world, the presence of the bank may motivate
the agents to strategically hide or disclose information,
and all the intrinsic attributes of the agents are quantifi-
able, allowing us to control for a rich set of covariates,
e.g. from firms’ financial statements. And last, the
topology of the network may provide additional insight
that may help to uncover the processes generating such
networks. The generating processes can unravel if we
could use the network to discover production chains, or
rather production trees by means of flow dynamics, or
locate central nodes by means of agent-based traversal.
Many studies of financial networks [44], [40], [5]
assume that the network data are complete in the sense
that the visible nodes and links are all there is. Such
a working assumption is shared across disciplines that
use networked data, and the sampling procedures are
usually random in order to correct for known biases
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[38], [23], [22]. Yet, what if links are missing inten-
tionally, that is, not at random? And what if the process
that is causing linkages to be missing is itself a pro-
cess of the network? With these questions in mind it
may be plausible to revisit the family of works on trade
credit [34] [36] and others on stock exchange trading
and modeling noting that another kind of process that
causes missing data may exist; and that this process
is part of the network’s generating mechanisms. We
believe that our approach offers a change in perspec-
tive in the analysis methodology that may constitute
a proper statistical examination for this possible non-
random cause of missingness, non-response [43], [24]
and non-observability [38].
Measuring real-world complex networks has be-
come a growing trend in the past decade [21], [25],
[20] mainly for two reasons: (1) the development of
methods for deducing the processes underlying the
generation of a network from its structure [37] [11]
[31] and (2) the growing availability of detailed digital
data on the interactions between participants. How-
ever, the overall impact of many such underlying
processes deduced from network structures has been
called into question because of a suspicion that, in the
process of creating a network model, links were re-
moved in the sampling process. The accidental re-
moval of even a single link may, in some cases, de-
form the realized network’s topology such that the re-
searcher is led to interpret the structure inaccurately
and create a false understanding of the real processes.
Furthermore, in networks it is sometimes useful to
predict the missing links in order to obtain a work-
able structure [28], [1]. Now, link prediction re-
quires knowing the class of network under investiga-
tion. False inference on the generating process may
lead to a wrong guess of the network classification and
may pull the prediction to form a network model that
is not true to reality. It is therefore not surprising that
a myriad of such ‘damaged’ networks are, and were,
discarded.
In a later study, [19], the authors address the prob-
lem of the reliability of links. They use a stochastic
block model framework to create a reliability measure
of individual links, given the observation and a family
of acceptable realizations thereof. The link reliabili-
ties are used to identify missing and spurious interac-
tions in the observed network. The authors then test
the performance of their approach by randomly adding
and removing links from five high-quality, error-free
networks which results in high accuracy of feature re-
covery.While their approach is designed to predict the
potential appearance of spurious links,our methodol-
ogy aims to provide non-invasive tools that would as-
sist in determining whether nodes or links are missing
at random, or that a strategic, systematic missingness
is more likely the case. For this reason, we stress that
this study does not aspire to offer a method for link
prediction or draw inferences on the topology of the
true network.
Our paper is related to several other distinct
branches of existing literature. One is on-line self-
disclosure and impression management, and informa-
tion manipulation in social networks. This literature
demonstrates the prevalence of information manipu-
lation regarding participants physical attributes in on-
line dating sites [45], and the role of the number of
friends and their appearance and behavior on evalua-
tions of individuals in social networks [47], [46], [49].
Further, it relates to discussions on the strategic, sig-
nalling role of displaying one’s social connections on
social network profiles [9], [10]. The main empirical
finding in these papers is that popularity and attrac-
tiveness of individuals in social networks are strongly
affected by their friends’ appearance. While our study
finds similar effect in a real world financial network
it has a different focus and implications. Popularity,
which determines social status and payoff, is replaced
by credit worthiness, that determines financial costs
and so economic profits. Rather than focusing on ap-
pearance of one’s friends’ and the effect it has on the
social status, our work is centered around developing
a method to uncover strategic information withholding
given the varying sensitivities of different agents’ pay-
offs to the appearance of their social or business ties.
Our main claim is that manipulated information has an
effect on the part of the network that is visible, rather
than on the status of individuals, and this is what we
seek to explore.
Further, the paper is related to the literature on hid-
den populations. This literature highlights the useful-
ness of networks in resolving the sampling problem
of subgroups that are deliberately missing from the
records [39], [14], [24]. Several studies are concerned
with problems of missing data in networks in longitu-
dinal studies. There, evolution of the network structure
is part of the cause for missingness [23]. Sampling
and consequent analyses of hidden populations, such
as cocaine users, sexual disease transmission, crimi-
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nal networks or other networks where observations are
missing, may be carried out by link-tracing [35], [41]
or link-prediction [8], [33]. Alas, in many cases link
tracing is not possible since a second round of queries
to the actors may not be attainable, and link predic-
tion should be avoided for reasons mentioned above.
Some argue that more data in greater detail are needed
to accurately derive the nature of the social effect [29].
However, if data are missing not at random gathering
more data will not improve the network description.
In a recent paper directly related to ours [42], the
authors make a first systematic attempt to account for
non-random missingness of links and its effect on es-
timates of key network statistics, by removing nodes
through a weighting process that factors in centrality of
nodes and chance. Using select networks and network
measures, and controlling for the portion of missing
links, the authors then pursue a set of Monte Carlo sim-
ulations of taking out nodes in these networks. Finally,
they compare the simulated to the original ones in or-
der to gauge the level of bias that missing links impose.
Their main finding is that bias is worse when central
nodes are missing. While their approach is intended to
gauge the level of bias, given the percentage of links
missing and species (e.g. central vs. non-central), our
contribution is to determine how likely is the given
visible network formed through a process of strategic
withholding of links from an influential observer, with-
out any prior knowledge on the node species and per-
centage of missing links.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; the
Materials and Methods section gives basic defini-
tions and formal concepts, and describes the proce-
dure. In section A case study in the real-world we ap-
ply the methodology on a large-scale real-world inter-
firm trade network. We conclude and discuss several
implications and limitations of our method in the last
two sections. In the appendices we give an overview of
financial trade networks, and lay out descriptive statis-
tics that accompany the case study.
Materials and Methods
In this section we lay out the formalism of two mu-
tually dependent network models: the monitored net-
work (V,E) ofN nodes V = {i1, . . . , iN} and L links
E = {e1, . . . , eL} and the true network (V ′, E′) that
has N ′ nodes and L′ links. The nodes perform inter-
actions, and so they will be referred as agents. Fur-
ther, a single, unique, observer exists in the system,
who can see the monitored (V,E) but not the true net-
work (V ′, E′). This observer interacts with agents and
may reward them based on the agents to which they are
linked. We assume that the visible network is a subset
of the true one. Formally we write (V,E) ⊆ (V ′, E′),
and consequently N ≤ N ′ and L ≤ L′.
We mark the symbols designating the true network
with a prime (′).
Basic Definitions
We consider the network of N ′ agents, of which only
N are visible to the observer. A directional weighted
link exists between pairs of agents if they interact. An
ordered pair (c, s) ∈ V × V designates a directional
link between an interacting pair of two nodes c, s ∈ V ,
who play different roles in this interaction. Each direc-
tional link c → s has an associated weight wcs. Sim-
ilarly for the pair (c′, s′) ∈ V ′ × V ′. To motivate this
we could imagine a network of (c)ustomers who pay
amounts of wcs upon purchasing goods from (s)ellers.
Let Θ be the set of all possible agent species with a
typical element θ ∈ Θ. The agent’s species is relevant
in our set-up, as the observer determines an agent’s
pay-off based on their species.
Following standard Bayesian analysis, there exists a
prior probability distribution p over the set Θ which is
common knowledge, such that Pr(θ ∈ Θ) is known.
The categorized species of an agent could be its credit
rating, as discussed in the example section A case
study in the real-world. We mark the species of agent
s by θs. It is noteworthy that θs may not be accessible
to the observer, and that this fact will come in handy
later on. In a similar way we can define the band-
width function Ws that may operate on the subset of
agents X neighboring with s to extract the weights on
the links pointing to agent s: Ws[X] = {wxs | (x, s) ∈
X × V }. We will use W instead of Ws where it is ob-
vious.
The pair (c′, s′) in the true network, may not be vis-
ible to the observer. This can happen only if the pair is
in the complement of the visible network (V †, E†)
(V †, E†) = (V ′, E′) \ (V,E) (1)
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Pairs that are symbolized (c, s) are strictly members
of the visible network and ones written as (c†, s†) are
strictly invisible to the observer.
We define the set of actions available to the observer
as A = {a1, a2, . . . } with a typical action ao ∈ A.
Similarly, we define by M the set of actions available
to the agent, and call this set the messages. A message
ms ∈ M sent out by agent s gives away part of the
information about agents that are directly and visibly
linked to s, Vs
Vs = {c | (c, s) ∈ (V,E)}
In contrast, the true neighborhood of s, V′s, may en-
capsulate Vs and can be defined as
V′s = {c | (c, s) ∈ (V ′, E′)}
Examples of these definitions can be seen in figure 1:
Vs1 = {c1, c2, c3}, V′s1 = {c1, c2, c3, c10}, Vs2 =
{c4, c5, c6}, andV′s2 = {c4, c5, c6, c7, c8, c9}. s3 and
its neighborhood Vs3 are all in (V †, E†). The mes-
sages passed to observer O, ms1 and ms2, can be any
set of parameters on Vs1 and Vs2.
c1
c2
c3
s1
s2 c4
c5
c6
c7
c8c9
s3c12
c11
c13
c10
w1
w2
w3
w4
w5
w6
Oms1
ms2
Figure 1: A sketch of the possible situations in a monitored
network. Following (1), the boxed area is (V,E), where in-
formation on the agents and the links is visible. Dashed links
and hollow nodes outside of the boxed area are in (V †, E†).
The blue agents are either in contact with the observer O or
exposed to it. The double arrows carry messages between the
agents and the observer. In the text are some walk-through
examples.
We now focus on the right member of the ordered
pair, s, who we define as the agent that may interact
with the observer. This member of the pair may choose
to play strategies in which partial or all information
may be concealed from the observer. For this reason,
the species of agent s has two components: a histori-
cal component Rs based on past interactions with the
observer, and the social interaction component W [m′s]
The reason for this separation is that Rs is accessi-
ble to the observer at all times, but the neighborhood-
related component W [m′s] that potentially affects the
payoffs, may not be so. To illustrate the use of Rs
and W [m′s] we could consider the credit ratingRs of a
firm s which reflects the historical moral of payments
of the borrower. However the overall risk of default
might also depend on the current business activities
with the financial neighborhood of first degree. Thus
W [m′s] may be the mean financial costs among all the
trade-partners. Hereafter we define W ′s := W [m
′
s] for
brevity and call it the neighborhood indicator of agent
s.
Asymmetry of information thus exists owing to the
fact that θs is selectively disclosed and should be esti-
mated by the observer from a probability distribution.
So, in order to take proper action the observer esti-
mates the species of s based on this prior probability
Pr(θs ∈ Θ) and additional information delivered by
the message ms.
A possible message may contain the identities of all
the neighbors of s:
m′s = {c | c ∈ V′s} (2)
however, the agent may play a strategy of disclosing
partial information about his neighbors. i.e. sending
the message ms ⊆ m′s. A message that is a subset of
m′s we name the information set of node s.
In several set-ups we may find that more information
is carried than only the set of neighboring nodes. We
will encounter such a set-up in the example section.
Thus (2) may be redefined as
ms =
{
(c, θˆc) | c ∈ Vs
}
(3)
for a subset of m′s, where θˆc may be any set of argu-
ments intrinsic to c. The information exposure of each
node could be a summary indicative of the difference
between
∑
c θˆc and its counterpart
∑
c θˆ
′
c under full in-
formation.
The payoff that every player would like to maximize
in his own benefit is a scalar marked by u(·). Payoffs
are earned after each single binary interaction of the
observer and an agent. There are three determinants
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to the payoffs: the agent species, its message and the
observer’s action. This can be written as
us, uo : Θ×W [M ]×A −→ R
where the payoff of an agent is us, and the observer’s
payoff from acting upon is uo(s). Here, W [M ] =
{Ws|ms ∈ M} is the set of all neighborhood indices
estimated from the set of messages M .
Let us now recall a previously drawn distinction be-
tween monitored and unmonitored networks. Designa-
tion of the social ties corresponds, in general, with two
dimensions: the species {θc | c ∈ m′s} and the species
θs of the supplier s, and the weights on the links point-
ing to s, W ′s. With perfect information, the observer
may take action a′ corresponding exactly to these pa-
rameters, to receive the optimal payoff in a transaction
with agent s, u′o(s) = u(θs,W [m
′
s], a
′). If information
is reduced, the observer must complement the missing
details with what he has. The optimal payoff then be-
comes uo(s) = u(θˆs,W [ms], a), a function of the re-
duced message ms, the expected species of the agent
θˆs, and the now optimal action a. Hereafter in certain
contexts we may omit the factors that u(·) implicitly
relies on.
For two individuals s1 and s2 of different species
θs1 6= θs2 , we say that s1 is more sensitive than s2
to the impact of its relationship with its neighborhood
whenever its expected payoff is more responsive to the
neighborhood indicator. Namely,
dIE
[
u(W ′s1)
∣∣ θs1]
dW ′s1
>
dIE
[
u(W ′s2)
∣∣ θs2]
dW ′s2
(4)
from this follows the information disclosure strategy
of the species towards the observer in the sense that
s1, being of species θs1 is more selective in exposing
information. This condition motivates our conception
of measuring the network under the hypothesis of an
influential observer.
The next section uses these diagnostics in a case
study of a real-world business network. There, we
classify the agents to species in the form of credit-
rating classes, we identify the self-interested observer
in this network which is the bank, we show the sen-
sitivity that firms of different rating classes exhibit to
the impact of the bank’s rating mechanism, and that
given this differential sensitivity we define the infor-
mation exposure that gives rise to two main strategies
of disclosure: as expected, agents that are more sen-
sitive to their neighborhood’s trading pattern will be
more selective in giving away information to the bank.
We explain these by means of standard economic the-
ory, and conclude with mediation analysis to rule out
alternative hypotheses to the existence of a monitoring
entity.
For general background on financial networks, and
descriptive statistics on our network, collected by an
Italian bank the reader is referred to appendices A and
C.
A case study in the real-world
In this section we deploy analysis on a test case from
the financial real world. We follow the procedure pre-
scribed in the introduction, namely:
• Present evidence on network attributes with con-
trast to what would be expected under full infor-
mation.
• Describe a theory from which a species-
dependent information exposure is likely to be
present.
• Present the revealed pattern in our test case net-
work compared to the one expected under random
sampling design.
• Perform mediation analysis where we rule out the
possibility that this observation is given by other
intervening variables.
Let us now consider the financial system that was
mentioned previously, where the agents are firms that
buy or sell from each other using invoices (later to be
termed Trade Credit), and the observer is a bank. The
theoretical foundation is the profit maximization prin-
ciple [48], the species are risk classes of agents, the
payoffs are the profit functions of the firms, the mes-
sages that firms send are the result of a strategic choice
on the amount of sales invoices to expose and which
of their sales invoices to bring to the bank as collat-
eral for a loan, and the strategies that the bank plays
are the interest rates charged on their loans. Both the
agent and the observer play their strategies conditional
on the species of the agent.
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We will soon find that many observations on this
network place in our hand the possible rejection of the
hypothesis that the network is unmonitored. A brief,
non-exhaustive, list of evidence is the elimination of
most nodes and links with minimal cleaning procedure,
the complete breakage of the network to paths shorter
than the production chain [26], and the inability to de-
tect propagation of distress in the 2008 financial crisis
[18].
For further details on financial networks in general
and trade credit networks we refer the reader to ap-
pendix B.
Network characteristics
In order to convince the reader that the network has
a problem we intend to contrast several stylized facts:
(a) the network is directed and is an agglomerate of
trees (such that money is expected to travel long dis-
tances), (b) the network is negatively assorted (so that
agents of similar connectivity don’t engage), (c) the
structure of the system is similar to a social network,
and: (d) money travels short distances (long paths are
not utilized), (e) buyers are also sellers (the network is
not bipartite and loops should occur), and (f) the agents
have a strong tendency to affiliate with like agents
(contrasting the negative degree assortativity feature).
Taken together, bullets (a) through (f) surrender the
possibility that the network indicates that an influen-
tial observer exists.This concludes the first prerequisite
and warrants further testing according to our proposed
methodology.
We begin our exploration by looking at some bare
topological measures of our system and comparable
ones. Table 1 lists networks that are known to be
directed and possess a social component. Following
a cleaning procedure that utilizes financial considera-
tions, we present our network on the rightmost column.
We elaborate on the cleaning procedure in appendix C.
Browsing the common measures of the directed net-
work, we find that connected component sizes are
small. The size of the largest component is 101,186
nodes (out of a total of 345,403 nodes) with a diam-
eter of 20. Of the remaining 244,217 nodes, 239,780
are situated in small clusters of 1 link each. In many
of the sub-graphs the central nodes deal small contract
sizes, e.g. phone companies or couriers, each of which
is financially irrelevant to the system due to the ex-
tremely small total transaction volumes between them
and each of their peers. Filtering out these irrelevant
firms causes the network to break completely.
Next we address the question of whether the net-
work is similar to a social network, from interaction
of seller-buyer pairs and their respective credit ratings.
The distribution of the in-degree of sellers often reveals
information about the way a network is formed. Here
the in-degree distribution is a power law, indicating an
association mechanism similar to popularity. Although
the seller is required to recruit the buyers, in the rel-
evant literature on diffusion we witness an inevitable
coupling of mass media (external factors) and word of
mouth (local factors). A good historical review of mar-
ket models can be found in [17]. In order to render a
power law of the degree distribution, the seller’s own
reputation should act to reverse the damping effect of
diffusion due to e.g. advertisement. This confirms the
point we made that the network is social.
As for peer-interaction in financial context, the
credit rating of sellers and their buyers are measur-
ables external to the network’s topological ones. Us-
ing these, we intend to show more evidence support-
ing our claim of non-random missingness: Generally,
large firms deal with large contracts, small firms deal
small. Although there are exceptions, e.g. the phone
and courier companies, figure 2 indicates that having
many buyers means both that the median contract size
is small and that the neighbor’s degree is likely to be
small. The conclusion is that the clustering around a
seller is negatively assorted. In other words, highly
connected firms tend to be positioned away from one
another in the network and thus render the network
more vulnerable to systemic shock (removal of the
highly-connected sellers creates an impact across the
whole network because their neighborhoods are not
densely interconnected). The merit here is that the net-
work is less likely to percolate in the sense that distress
does not spontaneously amplify itself [32].
Further, we created a cross tabulation of RATING
scores for all sellers in the data set MCS (cf. appendix
C) and their buyers that have RATING information,
which is summarized visually in figure 3. RATING
of the seller is in the columns and RATING of their
buyer is in the rows. Table elements are therefore enu-
merations of all pairs of RATING scores possible in
the data. Essentially this is a description of RATING
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network email LJ WikiTlk Amazon Our
Nodes 265214 4847571 2394385 403394 345403
Edges 420045 68993773 5021410 3387388 2874830
Nodes Largest WCC 224831 (0.85) 4843953 (0.99) 2388953 (0.99) 403364 (1.00) 341023 (0.98)
Edges Largest WCC 395270 (0.94) 68983820 (1.00) 5018445 (0.99) 3387224 (1.00) 1091873 (0.38)
Nodes Largest SCC 34203 (0.13) 3828682 (0.79) 111881 (0.05) 395234 (0.98) 101186 (0.29)
Edges Largest SCC 151930 (0.36) 65825429 (0.95) 1477893 (0.29) 3301092 (0.97) 193198 (0.56)
Clustering Coeff 0.0671 0.2742 0.0526 0.4177 0.003
Triangles 267313 285730264 9203519 3986507 195318
Frac. Closed. Triangs 0.001373 0.04266 0.001112 0.06206 2.04e-05
Diameter 14 16 9 21 20
90% Effective Diam. 2.5 6.5 4 7.6 12
Table 1: Comparison of topological measures in directed networks that may possess a social component. The parentheses
give proportions from the full data. Our network is on the rightmost column, other data sets are from [27]. The clustering
coefficient and the fraction of closed triangles (underlined) indicate a directional tree-like structure, which is expected from a
production chain. However, together with the large diameter it contrasts the reciprocity of roles, namely that half of the nodes
are buyers and sellers. WCC=Weakly connected component, SCC=Strongly connected component.
on the two ends of each link between trading firms.
From this table we created a χ2 test of indepen-
dence of the categories. This test produced a statistic
χ2 = 2803 with 56 degrees of freedom and a p-value
identical to zero. The conclusion is that we can reject
complete independence between RATING of a seller
and the average RATING of his buyers and suggest a
tendency of sellers to affiliate with buyers having sim-
ilar RATING.
The figure shows the tile mosaic of the paired RAT-
ING classes with color coding that reveals the tendency
of sellers to associate with buyers having a similar
RATING; the area of each tile in the mosaic is pro-
portional to the number of pairs where seller has RAT-
ING=X and buyer has RATING=Y. A blue tile marks
significantly higher than expected occurrence, and a
red color paints a significantly lower than expected pair
count.
The result of combining the stylized facts, and the
additional financial parameters leaves a rather empty
picture of the full network structure. Furthermore, the
financial insight (like the contract sizes or the produc-
tion chain lengths) contributes to the uncertainty in
classifying the static and dynamic properties of this
network. Thus, the network measures encourage us to
move further to the next step of providing a theory.
Theoretical foundations for strategic in-
formation exposure by different classes of
agents
The principle of thinking at the margin, a profit
maximization approach
Is there any systematic difference between the amount
of information that firms expose to the bank? Present-
ing invoices to stand as collateral against a loan with
higher face value than is really needed may have a non-
trivial effect on the borrower’s terms on loan: On the
one hand, with the now larger collateral presented, the
face value of the loan will be greater. On the other
hand, by exposing an invoice representing a sale made
to a non credit-worthy buyer, the borrower runs the risk
of tarnishing their own reputation.[49]. To better un-
derstand the workings of these two conflicting effects,
we must resort to the fundamental economic principle
of “thinking at the margin”, or marginalism. The ap-
plication of this principle here is straightforward: once
enough collateral is discounted to finance the produc-
tion stage, the incremental contribution of yet another
invoice in extending more credit from the bank be-
comes unnecessary for covering costs of production.
While this principle of marginalism motivates the
withholding of certain invoices from the bank, there’s
yet a need to explain why this scenario is most ap-
propriate to middle-rated firms. To complete the pic-
ture, we introduce another well-known concept of Ho-
mophily, which refers to the tendency of agents to as-
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Figure 2: Median contract size 2(a) and average buyer
(neighbor) degree 2(b) plotted against seller’s degree Kin,
from the sellers in the trade-credit full network (n=273,726).
The network is dissortative both in connectivity and mass.
The slope in 2(b) can be approximated by K−1.24in .
sociate with those bearing similar characteristics. This
phenomenon was found in many social systems, and
many markets in particular (e.g. the labor market
where profitable firms match with high productivity
workers, or the marriage market [4]). As seen in Fig-
ure 3, this is also the case in our trade network: Sell-
ers associate with same-rating buyers. Now, figure 4
provides evidence that low-credit rated buyers show
a tendency to engage in small sales. This, combined
with the marginalism argument presented above, has a
straightforward practical implication: Chances are that
credit constrained sellers would not sell to large and
reputable buyers. Should they require financing, they
may collateralize the bulk of their invoices, large and
small.
A similar practice is applied by sellers with solid
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Figure 3: Affinity between sellers and buyers. A com-
pressed tiles mosaic of the cross tabulation RATING seller
× RATING buyer of the 2,802,976 (c, s) pairs. The plotting
scheme is described in [16].
credit histories. These sellers enjoy good terms on
loan, so with the aim of getting as much ‘cheap’ credit
as possible, these high-rated sellers have no reason to
withhold invoices, as the majority of these invoices
don’t incur the implicit penalty of reduced terms on
loan. In between are the middle rated sellers that sell
to either high or low rated buyers (large and small).
These sellers would exercise logic to prioritize their
receivables when presented for discounting.
The sensitivity of an agent to its neighborhood
Consider a seller embedded inside its trade-
neighborhood of buyers Vs. We may recall pre-
requisite (iii) in the introduction section, that describes
how the network must lend itself to measure the
sensitivities of nodes of different species with respect
to the neighborhood indicator.
We now consider the financial costs (FC) of the par-
ticipants.1 This factor is intrinsic to all nodes, includ-
ing the direct neighbors of any agent. So it is possible
to measure the correspondence between an agent’s fi-
nancial costs and the aggregated financial costs of its
neighbors. Figure 5 plots this estimation. The axes
give the financial costs of a seller and the geometric
mean of the financial costs of his customers, in loga-
rithmic values. In this instance, little or no correlation
exists between the financial costs across the trade rela-
tionships.
We could further plot these financial costs vs. neigh-
1Roughly, this is the interest paid on loans.
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Figure 4: A χ2 test, rejecting complete independence be-
tween a buyer firm’s credit-rating and their total invoiced
obligations (p-value < 2.2 × 10−16 with df=72). The mo-
saic suggests a tendency of the buyers to partition into two
groups: credit-worthy buyers that pay large amounts in trade-
credit, and credit-constrained buyers that, in addition, share
the low-end of the market purchase power. We highlight sev-
eral points: (1) that middle-rated firms exercise purchases to
a greater extent than other classes (both high and low), and
(2) that risky firms make purchases on credit at an order of
magnitude less than the other classes.
borhood mean financial costs separately per each credit
rating class. The estimator for different credit rating
classes, which is shown in figure 6, gives evidence
that a percent change in the financial costs of the sup-
plier corresponds with up to 7.9% in the average fi-
nancial costs across the direct neighbors, depending on
the credit rating of the seller. The greatest effect can
be seen among the ‘B’, or medium rated firms, while
the ‘A’ rated firms show little or no effect. Compared
against the overall effect in figure 5, this figure demon-
strates that the FC/S ratios of sellers belonging to the
‘B’ and ‘C’ credit rating classes exhibit greater sensi-
tivity to their neighboring nodes.
It is important at this stage to appreciate that dif-
ferent sensitivities to the immediate neighborhood do
exist through this internal property of financial costs.
The information exposure
One of the quantities determining the proportion of the
network visible to the bank is the ratio between the to-
tal amount in the invoices that each seller s registered
at the bank during the year, over their annual net-sales,
as reported in their financial statement. This provides
the necessary topological aggregate of the network un-
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Figure 5: Financial costs (interest paid) over sales of a seller
log(FC/S) compared against log average FC/S of the buyer.
The main effect is negligible between the FC/S of a seller
and < FC/S > of the trade-neighborhood.
der full information, as required by our method. To
describe this quantity we use the following parameters.
We name the agents in the ordered pair (c, s) as the
(c)ustomer (i.e. the buyer) and the (s)upplier. Both are
members of the population of agents V .
The amount of invoices that seller s sent to customer
c and which he also presented as collateral to the bank
for a loan we call Rcs. This is the annual aggregate of
the invoices presented by s on account of the contracts
written by him to his customer c. The face value of an
invoice serves as collateral for a short term loan in the
‘credit line’. The annual total of all the invoices that s
presented to the bank is:
Rs =
∑
c∈Vs
Rcs (5)
This amount should be a good proxy for the amount of
the total of short term loans that s received to finance
production.
The information exposure of seller s, symbolized
is, is the proportion of sales of seller s, that were pre-
sented as collateral:
is = Rs/Ss (6)
A quick interpretation of the information exposure pa-
rameter could be the following: The net-sales Ss is an
item listed in the profit and loss statement of a firm and
is an annual aggregate (also termed a flow variable).
The net sales item condenses all possible profit-making
activity of the firm, and implicitly includes all the pos-
sible information from the firm’s trade neighborhood
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Figure 6: with reference to (4), log(FC/S) of the seller
is plotted against log average FC/S of the buyer neigh-
borhood. The agents are grouped into the three investment
grades. It is immediately evident that high credit rated sell-
ers (in panel A) have little or no correlation with the finan-
cial costs of their buyers, while the medium (B) and low
(C) credit-rated sellers percentage increases in financial costs
correspond with constant percentage changes in the mean fi-
nancial costs of their neighborhood. These elasticities are
estimated as 7.9% and 4.6% respectively.
in the full network, thus it is a rough description of
the reduction in information ms \ m′s. The numerator
Rs, is the aggregate face value of all the invoices pre-
sented for discount in the short term. Thus, firms run-
ning on low profit margins are expected to display ‘i’
relatively close to 1 because the amount of operational
credit should be proportional (and close to) the sale
amount. A low ratio of collateral size over net-sales
means that in the short term, the firm leverages to a
lesser extent in order to finance the production or goes
to get credit elsewhere. For this latter claim we assume
that our sample is not biased and therefore, the credit
obtained from other banks occurs uniformly across all
the firms in our sample.
The value of ‘i’ is greater or equal to zero and can
exceed unity. There are three possible situations:
• ‘i’ could be greater than one. A naive2 view for
2We assume that our data does not contain traces of illegal activ-
ity. Otherwise we would have to remove from our dataset firms that
have i > 1.
why i > 1 is that there is misalignment between
the time-frames in the data; the closing of the au-
dit and the expiration of all trade-credit contracts
that were signed in the same year.
• If seller s has i = 0, the numerator in (6) van-
ishes. The interpretation is that s is not a direct
client of the bank. Rather his customer, c, is. The
customer c entered s into the system by executing
an outgoing payment transaction.
• When i 1, a discrepancy exists between the to-
tal collateral and the net-sales. This could hint
that the production of s requires loans that are
smaller than the sales. It is an indication of a
healthy use of the credit line.
This variable should not be confused with the infor-
mation sets ms and m′s. It is however possible that is
and ms may represent the same identities exactly, i.e.
in networks where only exposure summaries are avail-
able. In the example set up, the typical message will
be written as in (3). Here θˆc will be the credit rating of
s’s customer, c. Based on the last two sections in the
introduction, the RATING score is expected to have a
non-trivial relationship with information exposure. We
will therefore define quantities that relate the two, such
as the average information exposure for each RATING
score. This is estimated over seller firms s that have
rating score r. The set of sellers with rating r is
Sr := {s : Rs = r}, (7)
whereRs is the RATING score of firm s. The average
information exposure over all firms having the same
RATING is
i¯(r) =
1
|Sr|
∑
s∈Sr
is, (8)
where is is the information set of seller firm s. In fur-
ther analysis we will filter out firms having i > 2.
The revealed effect
Let us consider what would the information exposure
parameter i¯ look like were we to introduce it under ran-
dom sampling assumptions. For this a work by Watan-
abe et. al. [50] that estimates the relationship between
in-degree and the total of accounts receivable is use-
ful. They used a full business network where only the
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identities of firms are known (no fund transfers were
recorded). They estimated that under full information
m′s = ms independent of the rating, and so, grouping
(6) by size classes we have i¯ = 〈R/S〉 = const ≈ 1.
Figure 7 reflects our finding in contrast to this estima-
tion.
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Figure 7: Information exposure of sellers against their credit
worthiness in two situations: The revealed effect and the
expected theoretical effect under the random. To increase
our confidence in the ordering of RATING we use Finan-
cial Costs over Total Bank Loans as a convenient continuous
proxy parameter, since RATING is ordinal (For grouping by
RATING classes we refer to fig. 9). Far up the Y-scale we
theorize the information disclosure under the random, with
a symmetric envelope of error bars that have the maximal
widths of the main plot on the bottom. There, i¯ is approx-
imately unity and independent of the credit-worthiness, so
shows [50].
Notably, in the figure we use a continuous quantity
as a proxy for credit worthiness otherwise described
in this document by the RATING variable. The un-
derlying intuition is straightforward; note that sellers
with good credit rating will usually enjoy low interest
rates and a relatively seizable credit line. Consequently
they obtain low values of FC/TBL. On the other ex-
treme, low-credit firms have limited access to bank
credit hence their FC/TBL is expected to be greater
(χ2 = 5522.97, df=49, p-value < 2.2 × 10−16, in the
test of independece between RATING and FC/TBL).
As we can see in figure 7 the effect of information
exposure with credit worthiness is significantly distin-
guishable from what would be expected under random
sampling. This rules out the possibility that random
missingness and sampling errors constitute the main
effect.
This is a summarizing evidence in support of the ex-
istence of an observer and the implied intentional ex-
posure by the agents. It still remains to see whether
other confounding factors may cause this observational
equivalence.
Mediation analysis
With reference to figure 3, it is important to note at
this stage that a χ2 test of independence is categorical
and does not take into consideration any ordering of
the columns or the rows. However, the table used as
input maintains the original ordering of the RATING
classes. Thus, the pattern that appears as blue along the
diagonal does indicate higher-than-expected encounter
of similarities in the two nodes sharing a trade-link.
And any other ordering of the columns or rows would
result in a less compelling pattern.
One reservation could be made on the result above:
it is remarkable that the RATING of the seller is so
similar to the average RATING score of their buyers.
Looking at the sectoral affiliation of the buyers and the
sellers (figure 8) it seems that sellers and buyers are, in
the main, trading inside the same industries especially
when within the manufacturing sectors (categories 1 ..
3 of the NACE industrial classification [13]).
The visual mosaic is symmetric, i.e. it can be trans-
posed while maintaining an almost identical pattern of
red and blue tiles. One exception is major category 5,
wholesale, that disrupts this symmetry. Firms in indus-
tries 1 and 3 sell to firms in 5. According to our data set
firms in 5 do not sell to those in 1 nor 3, but rather to
those in 4 (energy). In the real world, wholesale trade
does connect between manufacturers, but in our case, it
only provides a transient path out of the manufacturing
industries, and splits the supply chain. The accounting
procedures of wholesale firms are at the root of this
problem. A good explanation for this can be found in
[26].
Since sectoral affiliation is known as one of the
macro-determiners of RATING scores, we addressed
this conflation by creating a list of firms that trade out-
side their industry, and then performed the test of inde-
pendence of the RATING score again. Approximately
15% of the buyer-seller links connect firms from the
same industrial classification. Using only the inter-
industrial trades, we obtain a similar pattern as in fig-
ure 3 with high degree of confidence. Again we can
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Figure 8: Input-Output test of independence between buyer
and seller. The 1-digit NACE industrial classifications are
roughly: 1 . . . 3 manufacturing, 4 is energy, 5 is wholesale
and retail, 6 is transport, and 7 is real estate.
reject the hypothesis of complete independence of the
RATING score between buyers and their sellers, and
suggest the same trending behavior as before.
Figure 9 gives the relation between RATING and the
information exposure, ‘i’ in the colorful tiles, or its av-
erage i¯(r) as a curve. From this figure we learn that in-
formation exposure does indeed depend on RATING;
the average information exposure is at its minimum in
the middle of the RATING scale. RATING scores of
firms in the ‘speculative’ financing group 4 . . . 7 have
the lowest average information exposure. We postu-
late that these middle-rated firms optimize the amount
of information they expose.
To quantify the relation we created a partition of the
data set into equal-count ‘i’-groups: the set of 129,584
suppliers was ordered by ‘i’ and then a division into
groups was made every 12,958 or 12,959 records. The
smallest value of ‘i’ in each group give the tick labels
on the Y-axis. The area of each tile in the mosaic is pro-
portional to the count of sellers that have RATING=X
and i ∈ [Yt, Yt+1), t being the tick marker index. The
color code marks either significantly higher (blue) or
significantly lower than expected (red) frequency of
occurrence.
The relationship of RATING and ‘i’ is, again, a U-
shape.
In the two extreme RATING scores, 1 and 9, the in-
formation exposure is the greatest. This sits well with
the expectations that ‘investment’ grade firms will have
dispersed their risk and therefore are indifferent to col-
lateral quality. And that firms in risk of default will be
(or think they are) forced by the bank to surrender all
possible information.
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sure parameter i¯(r) as defined in (8). The grouping proce-
dure is described in the text. To illustrate the U-shape there
is an overlaying line plot of the averages i¯(r).
It might be that middle-rated borrowers are in less
need of credit or get their credit elsewhere. However,
seeing from the distribution of RATING classes most
of the firms in the industrial population are populating
the middle-rated places, and possibly sell to both the
investment and the credit constrained firms. Given this
frame, middle-rated firms collect sales (and collateral)
from the complete range of buyers. Should the “bad”
buyers coincidentally be the ultimate providers of col-
lateral with the smallest total face values, prioritizing
the invoices is straightforward based on probability of
payback, and marginal contribution to credit financing.
To show this we present a test of independence be-
tween buyer’s rating class and their total purchases
on trade-credit (amount of invoices that they received
from their sellers) in figure 4. The reason not to nor-
malize by the net-sales is that we’d like to keep the pre-
sented invoices clear of contamination by the implicit
social factors, and leave in only the direct and visible
ones.
We generate a cross tabulation of buyer firm rat-
ing class vs. equal-counts of buyer firms that are or-
dered by log of total invoice face values. The area (or
rather the heights) of the tiles in each column are scaled
proportional to the relative population sizes within the
same credit-rating class.
It is important to note at this stage that from the
financial statements the proportion of purchases over
sales is fixed at approximately half (across all financial
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statements - mean=0.49, median=0.45, n=513,082,
sd=0.42). In figure 4, the bulk of firms that make large
purchases is prominently situated in the middle credit-
rated classes. As such, it is a tracer for proportionally
larger production scale of the middle-rated firms and
thus they must be in greater need for credit, definitely
not less.
Not coincidentally, as the figure shows, if a seller
would rank buyers according to invoice face values, the
incrementally small additions to the total sales would
be from the lower-end rated partners.
If middle-rated sellers send out invoices exclusively
to middle-rated buyers (fig 3), but middle-rated sellers
also need less credit, (fig 9), then middle-rated buyers
should also be purchasing less in invoices, contrast to
what can be seen on figure 4, where they hold the high-
est volumes in purchases.
We could further suggest an alternative scenario that
supports the same observation of the U-shape (figure
9), whereby middle credit-rated suppliers use multiple
credit sources and therefore present smaller volumes
in collateral to each bank. This may occur whenever
presenting more collateral would have little effect on
the terms on loan with any single bank. Under such
‘decreasing returns’ scenario the U-shape may flat-
ten. However, reaching this plateau warrants starting
a new credit line elsewhere. It is noteworthy that this
possibility still falls within our methodology because
whether driven by impression management or by de-
creasing returns, information is withheld due to strate-
gic considerations on part of the borrower, giving rise
to differential information exposure across species. A
risk planning strategy of the bank is considered by us
inferior to the option of active withholding of infor-
mation by the borrower because competing banks may
exercise this same strategy by nature of their compe-
tition, and the fact that borrowers still take their busi-
ness with the monitoring bank, whose own view this
study exposes, means that prioritizing of invoices still
occurs. Controlling for externalities such as competi-
tion and geographical proximity to the financial sector
is in the scope of another paper currently in prepara-
tion.
Conclusion
A common working assumption in many studies is that
the observed network is observed at random and that
the network available to us is a representative sample
of the true network. A major challenge to this view
is posed by the possibility that the network is moni-
tored. Not only is the true network not visible to us,
neither is the process that causes the data to be miss-
ing. So a direct statistical test is not feasible. We offer
to circumvent this problem by a cascade of hypothe-
ses and mediation analysis. Assuming the network is
not monitored corresponds with the fact that the ob-
server’s payoff is not sensitive to the quality of the so-
cial ties, and the agents are not expected to withhold
information on quality. Therefore, the information ex-
posed by agents in the unmonitored network should be
independent of the species of the agent or else a spuri-
ous correlation should exist owing to the intervention
of mediators. Controlling for these mediators, one can,
in theory, test whether the network available to us pos-
sesses the species-independence property or not.
In the example we were able to: (a) show that data
are missing but not at random and suggest that the data
collector has an impact on the process by which firms
appear to associate, and especially on a certain sub-
group of the agents, namely the medium credit-rated
firms; (b) focusing on this subset of the agents, there is
a clear social dimension which is related to an account-
ing behaviour that is fondly termed in the literature
‘window-dressing’ [2] and thus (c) show that the im-
mediate neighborhoods of these agents are more likely
to be missing complete links and nodes structure; (d)
suggest a tendency of this network to be vulnerable to
targeted removal of specific species of nodes. These
species may be correlated with industries, similar to
the scenario of a systemic shock arising when the bank
issues a regulatory action on the industry as a whole.
Since the bank is collecting the data and so assumes
a point of view we suggest that (e) distress response
due to internal dynamics is rarely visible to the bank.
The synchronized response subsequent to an interven-
tion of the regulatory system is visible, however, be-
cause of its causal nature.
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Implications, applications and limi-
tations
We have developed a method for exploring data on net-
works in situations where hidden information affects
the outcome. Essentially to measure a network under
the hypothesis that data are missing not at random, we
choose a set that has (a) a system of interacting agents
classifiable into species, (b) an observer and visible in-
teractions between it and the players, (c) a theory that
describes the payoff and offers interpretation to why
would different species play different strategies. Fi-
nally (d) a measurable quantity of information that can
be compared from additional input.
The proposed methodology can be used to derive the
likelihood that an agent embedded in a network hides
information conditional on some characteristic of the
agent. In our empirical example this likelihood is asso-
ciated with the credit worthiness of an industrial firm:
medium rated firms have a higher probability to strate-
gically hide information from the observer. The ob-
server, in our specific case a bank, can use the proposed
methodology to identify a subset of the population of
corporate customers that are highly likely to hide in-
formation. This subset can be the target of a specific
action by the bank aimed at probing the supply chain
connections of the firm that are currently hidden. For
example, a possible policy would be to offer a lower
interest rate on loans if the firms present an invoice as
collateral. In a simple version this reduction can be
flat regardless of the rating of the buyer that is listed
on the invoice. In a more aggressive version the bank
can offer a higher reduction on interest for presenting
invoices issued to lower rated buyers. The goal is to
create an incentive scheme that encourages the suppli-
ers to disclose invoices that they otherwise would be
inclined to hide. Once the bank has acquired a more
precise picture of the firms’ supply chains, it can ad-
just the rating of the firms accordingly. The proposed
algorithm is essential in limiting the subset of firms
that are the target of these costly actions.
We believe that there is an internal ranking mech-
anism of social tie quality employed by agents that
renders their incentive to expose information about
some peers but not others. In trade networks the lower
ranked nodes may threaten the stability of the structure
more than the better-ranked ones. Therefore, the more
links are missing, the more is the structure suscepti-
ble to dynamic breakage. This intuition encourages the
possible replication of the method in other fields where
networks have a social component with either a rank-
ing mechanism, or that information exposure could be
quantified.
Last, this study points out the possibility that a sin-
gle observer exists and that this entity not only moni-
tors the agents but affects their payoffs. In other net-
works, several observers may exist and so agents may
vary their strategies accordingly; thus further conceal-
ing their links or even creating links that do not exist.
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A Financial trade networks
Financial networks are known for being negatively assorted, i.e. neighbouring nodes in the network are dissimilar,
in particular as regards to the degree of their in- and out-links. Among practitioners and economists this property
is desired because it renders the financial network robust to percolation (propagation of distress or growth). The
knowledge that contagion rarely happens may catch us by surprise when financial shocks do indeed propagate
from the local level to the national/international level. In the events preceding the 2008 financial crisis, small
systemic shocks affected large proportions of the industrial and trade networks. The usual response of firms to
market downturns was then amplified and this response swept across the network using the monetary (communi-
cation) channels. One reason for the lack of control over this incident was that a proportion of the communication
channels was not known to the banking system: the high risk mortgages were traded in the market but the credit-
unworthy clients behind them remained anonymous.
A.1 General characteristics of trade networks
Assortative mixing in networks is a term describing the correlation of ‘popularity’ between different nodes. Popu-
larity is attributed to a node and measured by the number of incoming links to it. A network is positively assorted if
the number of incoming links to a node is positively correlated with the number of incoming links of its neighbors.
In assorted networks messages can spread within a small number of steps since there are many redundant links via
which a message could travel. Negatively assorted networks contain highly connected nodes that are positioned
sparsely throughout the network. Thus, in this species of topology the fast spread of messages is less likely [32].
However, if attributes of nodes are known, it is possible to combine structural and behavioral information for
efficient routing inside this network [41].
A.2 Characteristics of the network under study
The asymmetric links in this network represent the exchange of goods/services for financial payments between
agents; it is similar to the better known communication networks. Each link is between a seller firm and one of
its customers who bought a product or service from them. Our data contain a snapshot in time of many firms that
provide goods and services in exchange for financial payments in the year 2007. This was the year when financial
crises were occurring global-wide [12].
These data were collected by a single large Italian bank, fulling its function as an intermediating agent in a
delayed payment procedure. The bank recorded the names of the two parties and the amounts of money that one
firm, the buyer, owes the other, the seller.
In the data, the network contains a record of financial interactions between peers. The interaction under inves-
tigation is recorded when a discount process occurs. The bare explanation of a discount on an invoice is that an
owner of an invoice will sell it to a financial institute for a lower price than its face value. The buyer of the invoice
will be the new creditor and will take upon himself the risk that the debtor will become insolvent. This risk is
combined into the rate of discount.
Today, banks offer their customers a cheaper alternative to selling their trade bills. A customer of the bank can
‘collateralize its accounts receivable’: instead of buying the invoice, the bank will extend a secured loan using the
face value of the invoice as collateral. It is commonly known that, when using discounted invoices, the borrower
firm is a seller, not a buyer. Extensive reviews of the reasons why this may be so were suggested in [34] and
[30]. Here we note one obvious reason: the seller needs to secure funds only for production of the goods/services,
whereas the buyer needs to cover the total amount of the invoice. i.e. the costs of production and the seller’s profit.
Lower amounts on loan impose less risk on the lender and in return a more affordable discount is offered.
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The data are not publicly available; they were directly accessible to only one researcher, who worked for the
bank. Programs to extract summary data from these two data sources were written by us and executed on a
computer inside the bank. The summary data, which we possess, were then further analysed to obtain the results
reported here.
B Credit rating and financial costs
In order to facilitate an efficient discounting mechanism the banks created a credit-rating procedure. When the
customers of the bank require loans, they should qualify as credit-worthy, i.e. be borrowers that are financially ca-
pable of paying back. Credit-rating is a score provided to all banks by an external entity;3 that uses a computerized
system which automatically assigns a RATING score, Rs, to each firm.
The score is independently computed from the financial statements of each firm and is in the range 1 . . . 9 where
low credit-rating is indicated by a high value. The common practice is to further group this index into classes: high
(Rs = {1 . . . 3}) which characterizes firms of investment grade, medium {4 . . . 6} for firms somewhat susceptible
to defaults, and low credit rating {7 . . . 9}. Firms that score into the ‘low’ class have a high probability to default
on payments. They are regarded by practitioners as having little or no access to bank credit. A firm with a score
of 9 will rarely qualify for borrowing. However, since these firms appear in our data as borrowers from the bank,
we assume that they did receive loans (figure 10); low credit rating could be caused by the industry in which the
firm operates. The calculation of the RATING score is proprietary but shows correlation with Altman’s Z-score
[3]. For a comprehensive explanation of the RATING score the reader is referred to [6]. It is also important to
note that the RATING score of a firm is visible to all the banks with whom that firm does business. This is part of
a transparent national credit system that was erected in Italy. A common credit registry is also available in other
countries.
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Figure 10: Histograms of sellers in MCS (cf appendix C): firm counts (N) and total net-sales (S) per RATING score. RAT-
ING=1, 2, 7 and 8 exhibit the largest deviation of sales per number of firms.
Naturally, there are more buyers than sellers. However, the distribution of RATING scores is identical once
normalized by the total number in each group. Figure 10 displays the RATING histograms of sellers.
Credit-rating affects the terms on loans. When a firm believes that its bank is imposing conditions that are
unreasonable, it may resort to other means of financing. In general, banks are the sole providers of loan financing
and by declining a loan based on its terms (interest rate) the firm must consider other financing channels, the most
intuitive of which are dropping the contracts, or using trade-credit; the firm will ask to delay its debt to sellers
and collect immediate payments from its buyers [36]. In either case, a social component is added to the pool of
3CeBi - Centrale dei Bilanchi, a financial analyses service for the Italian banking system.
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NACE N
10 3
11 426
12 84
13 9
14 757
15 3073
17 3779
18 2160
19 2076
20 2102
21 1433
22 3121
23 160
24 2438
25 3959
26 3444
27 1367
28 12628
NACE N
29 9199
30 298
31 2730
32 726
33 1721
34 771
35 414
36 4744
37 304
40 42
41 12
45 7997
50 4818
51 27808
52 3843
55 194
60 2550
61 21
NACE N
62 7
63 1360
64 135
65 1
67 51
70 87
71 382
72 3731
73 49
74 4636
80 92
85 220
90 556
91 10
92 273
93 214
Table 2: Sample coverage: the number of seller firms in the trade network of the year 2007, sorted by their
industrial sector. The list above excludes 6,569 firms with unidentified sectors. The industrial codes follow the
format in NACE v1.1[13]. Roughly 10-13 are mining, 15-37 are manufacturing, 50-52 is construction, and 71-74
are services.
financing channels, and this can be traced on the network of trading firms.
C Fundamental statistics
The privately operated and public firms in the Italian industries are all borrowers from the bank. The data sets
contain individual firm level information about transactions between firms (registered, collateralized invoices) and
financial statement data. In the example there are 1,578,812 firms connected by 7,290,072 trade links but only
273,726 of them are sellers (have incoming trade-credit links). The network nodes are crossed with available
balance sheet data of 703,858 firms in 2007. The balance sheet data come from the Italian Centrale dei Bilanchi
(CeBi) and is similar in structure to MICRO.1 that was presented in [7] and elsewhere. The resulting network
has 345,403 nodes connected by 2,874,830 links. In this network, 140,580 nodes are sellers and 129,584 of them
are sellers that appear in the next time. This subgroup of sellers is named MCS and the coverage by industry
appears in table 2 below. It is notable that the manufacturing and construction are the largest industries. Being
a seller in MCS means having balance sheet sales that are greater than zero, at least one incoming payment link,
and the linked buyers also have balance sheet information. Importantly, 122,728 of the sellers inMCS (94%) have
additional outgoing links, so they are also buyers. The remaining 215,819 firms in the network appear only as
buyers. Thus, to a proportion of one half the network of buyers and sellers cannot be classified as bipartite since
breaking the links from exclusive buyers leaves one third of the network intact (1/2 · 2/3 = 1/3). Further, this
observation design is at random: there are two bank consortia in Italy, and any borrower may do business with one
or the other. The nodes in MCS are guaranteed to be customers of this bank (borrowers), but a similar number of
customers should therefore be of the other bank. The remainder are simply buyers that do not finance production
via trade-credit. So we should expect an overlap of one third of the firms in the records of both banks. Indeed, all
nodes are buyers but out of 345,403 in total, 62% are not sellers that borrow from the bank that collects the data.
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NACE - The European industrial classification scheme is a hierarchical numbering system. The leftmost digit
is the major industry code. Further sub-classifications can be achieved by inspecting the less significant digits, up
to 4 digits. In our analyses we use a two-digit classification.
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